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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
The state appeals from the District Court's order suppressing evidence obtained as a
result of a warrantless blood draw after a refusal of a breath and blood test.

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A sheriff s deputy observed a car driven at speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour in a
marked 25 mile per hour zone. (R. p. 7) The car stopped in response to the deputy's lights,
and the deputy made contact with the cars' driver, Micah Wulff. (Id.) Wulff admitted he
"shouldn't be driving" and his car smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. (Id.) Wulff
admitted drinking and failed field sobriety tests. (Id.) Wulff stated he would not participate in
a breath test so the deputy took him to a hospital. (Id.) Wulff initially refused giving a blood
sample and told the nurse "you're not touching me." (R. pp 7) When two security officers
approached he allowed for the blood draw without further resistance. (R. p. 7-8)
The state charged Wulff with felony DUI. (R. pp 44-45) Wulff moved to suppress the
results of the blood draw because the state failed to obtain a search warrant. (R. 53-56) (R.
73-75) (R. 82-85) The District Court granted the motion, concluding that: "the recent United
States Supreme Court case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.

(2013) places new limits on

the ability oflaw enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant." Finding the U.S.
Supreme Court held: "in these drunk driving investigations where police officers can
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly
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undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so."
569 U.S. _ _ (2013) (R. p. 100-101) The state filed a notice of appeal. (R. p. 111-113)

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the District Court correctly hold that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __ (2013)
places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant
(R. p. 100-101 & p. 111-113) and suppression of the warrantless blood draw was required?
(R. p. 106-108)
III. ARGUMENT

The District Court correctly held that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __ (2013)
places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test
without a warrant and suppression of the warrantless blood draw is required.
(R. pp 106-108)

A. INTRODUCTION
The District Court concluded that Missouri v. McNeely, _ _ U.S. __,133 S. Ct.
1552 (2013) "places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test
without a warrant." (R. p. 100-101) (R. p. 11-113) The court held that "In McNeely, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[W]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving
suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances." McNeely, 569 U.S.

(2013) (R. p. 103) That to adopt the states

argument would "in essence, act as a per se exception to the warrant requirement. In tum,
implied consent statutes would have the effect of making the McNeely decision of little or
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no consequence ......... Therefore, despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court did not
directly discuss implied consent statutes, interpreting the McNeely opinion as permitting
forced blood draw's simply because a state has legislation that allows such action would
render the McNeely decision a dead letter." (R. p. 103)
B. STANDARDOFREVIEW
The standard of review of a District Court order granting or denying a suppression
motion is bifurcated factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but the Court
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v.

Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 183, 183 (2009)

C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MISSOURI V.
MCNEELY, 569 U.S. _ (2013) PLACES NEW LIMITS ON THE ABILITY
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO CONDUCT A BLOOD TEST WITHOUT
A WARRANT AND SUPPRESSION OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD
DRAW IS REQUIRED.

"Administration of a blood alcohol testing constitutes a seizure ofthe person, and a
search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905,
243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010) citing Schumber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767,
86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-918 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007) (other citation omitted). Searches and seizures performed
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id. (citation omitted) (R. p. 98-99)
The District Court went on to hold: "Under Idaho's implied consent statute, anyone
who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle is deemed to have impliedly
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consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol when an officer who has reasonable grounds
to believe in an individual is driving under the influence requests this testing. LeClercq,
149 Idaho at_, 243 P.3d at 1095-96, quoting Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302,160 P.3d at 741
(other citation omitted); I.C. § 18-8002(1). Such implied consent is an exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. at 1095, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.
Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (other citation omitted) This implied consent to
evidentiary testing includes testing of a suspect's blood or urine under I.C. § 18-8002, in
addition to Breathalyzer testing

the test requested is of the officer's choosing. Diaz, 144

Idaho at 302,160 P.3d at 741 citing Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833,41 P.3d 257,261
(2002).
According to Idaho case law, the right of an officer to order a blood draw is not
limited by LC. § 18-8002(6)(b). Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Under I.C. § 188002(6)(b), an order for a blood draw must be supported by probable cause that one of
the enumerated crimes, such as aggravated DUI or vehicular manslaughter, have
occurred. I.e. § 18-8002(6)(b). However, in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-34,41
P.3d 257,261-62 (2002), the Supreme Court ofIdaho "held that Idaho Code § 188002( 6)(b) limits only when an officer can order medical personnel to administer a blood
withdrawal but does not otherwise limit when an officer 'may request that a defendant
peacefully submit to a blood withdrawal.'" Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742

(quotingHalen, 136 Idaho at 834, 41 P.3d at 262 (emphasis supplied».
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Despite the fact that "[n]othing in Idaho Code § 18-8002 limits the officer's authority
to require a defendant to submit to a blood draw[,]" the recent United States Supreme
Court Case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _(2013), places new limits on the ability of
law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160
P.3d at 742. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[i]n those drunk-driving
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood
sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 569 U.S.

CR. p. 99-101)

Ultimately, the District Court found that "After Defendant refused the breath
test. ... Deputy Larson did not obtain a warrant prior to the blood draw." (R. p. 102) The
court further held: "there is no evidence or allegation that Defendant gave his consent to
blood draw, only that with the implied threat of force he succumbed to the test." (R. p.
102)
The court noted that the state argued that "once implied consent had been given by an
individual who has taken advantage ofthe privilege of driving on Idaho's roads that
individual cannot withdraw the implied consent." (R. p. 102)
The District Court correctly articulated the unconditional conditions doctrine which
prohibits the government from conditioning the grant of a privilege upon the waiver of a
constitutional right. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in Frost v. R.R. Comm In ofState of Cal.:
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[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited,
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require
the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existence.

Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of State ofCa!., 271 U.S. 583,593-94,46 S. Ct. 605, 607, 70 L. Ed.
1101 (1926)(emphasis ours) The doctrine has been applied in a number of jurisdictions,
including Arizona and Georgia, to the granting of the privilege to drive. Those courts
dealing with the issue have all held that the doctrine prevents the conditioning of the
privilege to drive upon the waiver of one's Fourth amendment rights. As it is now clear,
following McNeely, that motorists have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from
warrantless blood draws, absent a true showing of exigent circumstances, the state is not
free to condition the granting of the privilege to drive upon a citizen's waiver of that right.
In other words, consent may not be "implied" with respect to warrantless blood draws.
Idaho's implied consent law purports to condition the privilege to drive upon one
giving their implied consent to a warrantless blood draw upon law enforcement's
suspicion ofDUI. Idaho's Implied consent Statute, I.e. § 18-8002 provides in part:
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
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concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.

I.C. § 18-8002(1) Defendant recognizes that several Idaho courts, prior to McNeely, have
held that a driver was deemed to have given his "implied" consent to a warrantless blood
draw merely by driving upon the roadways of the state:
[u]nder Idaho's implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1), anyone driving on
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for
the presence of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to
believe the person was driving under the influence. In other words, "[b]y
virtue of this statute, 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a BAC
test.' " Rodriguez, 128 Idaho at 523,915 P.2d at 1381 (quoting Matter of
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 187,804 P.2d 911,916 (Ct.App.1990)). See also
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,160 P.3d 739. Implied consent to evidentiary testing is
not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's
blood or urine. I.e. § 18-8002(9)
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d 215,218-19 (Ct. App. 2008).
However, Defendant would argue that such a conditional grant of the privilege to drive
was not considered to afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that
under pre-McNeely jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional
right to be free from warrantless blood draws. See, State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 306, 328
P.2d 1065, 1071 (1958); see also, State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383,
1389 (Ct. App. 1984) As the McNeely decision has changed the constitutional landscape
in this regard, and it is settled that motorists do in fact have a protected Fourth

7

Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, the State is prohibited from
conditioning the granting ofthe privilege to drive upon a waiver of that right.
Due to the recency of the McNeely decision, only this recent District Court
decision has ruled on the constitutionality of states implied consent statutes with respect
to compelled blood draws. However, as stated infra, a number of courts have dealt with
the issue of statutorily implying consent to warrantless blood draws where the Fourth
Amendment would otherwise prohibit such a search, e.g. where probable cause was
lacking to suspect the motorist ofDUl. In each such case those Courts held that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibited the legislature from conditioning the grant
of the privilege to drive upon the waiver ofthe protections of the Fourth Amendment. In
other words, those courts held that the legislature could not circumvent the Fourth
Amendment by "implying" consent to an otherwise unlawful search. State v. Quinn, 218
Ariz. 66, 72-73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 2008), Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,
289-91,587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003), Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 986-87 on
reh'g~

793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
In State v.

Quinn~

the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a

section of the Arizona implied consent law which purported to "imply" a motorists'
consent to warrantless blood draws absent probable cause to believe the motorist to have
been DUI. Specifically, the statute at issue sought to imply consent in every instance
where a motorist was involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious injury to
another. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1193 (Ct. App. 2008) The
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defendant, Quinn, was involved in such an accident. It was undisputed that law
enforcement did not possess probable cause to believe Quinn to be DUL Nevertheless,
acting under authority of Arizona's implied consent statute, law enforcement extracted
blood without a warrant and absent actual consent. The State of Arizona argued that
consent was implied by the operation of statute:
[t]he State further asserts that, even assuming the statute does not fit within the
special needs exception, Quinn consented to the search because § 28-673
specifies that all those who drive a vehicle on Arizona roads consent to such a
search. In support it relies on Tornabene v. Bonine ex reI. Ariz. Highway
Dep't, 203 Ariz. 326,334,,19,54 P.3d 355, 363 (App.2002), which held,
"driving in Arizona is not a right, but a privilege, subject to legislative
mandate."
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72, 178 P .3d 1190, 1196 (Ct. App. 2008) In rejecting the

state's argument, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for
DUI prior to the extraction of blood:
[n]ormally, because any forced extraction of blood by the State invades one's
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, the intrusion is subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1,9, , 27,
49 P.3d 273, 281 (2002); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767,86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As Schmerber explains, the
State's unconsented-to search of a person's blood requires probable cause to
believe that the search will reveal the presence of controlled or intoxicating
substances. 384 U.S. at 768-71,86 S.Ct. 1826. The Schmerber Court stated
that:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any [ ] intrusions [into a person's blood] on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence
may disappear....
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Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826.

State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 68-69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1192-93 (Ct. App. 2008) Applying the

unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the statute, the Court ruled the statute an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority:
... states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a
constitutional right..."a statute cannot circumvent a firmly established
constitutional right."
As Schmerber makes clear, Quinn's constitutional right is to be free of any
searches of her blood "[i] n the absence of a clear indication" that her blood
would demonstrate the presence of alcohol or other controlled substances.
Thus, within the limits of the Constitution, the State cannot condition Quinn's
driving privilege on the surrender of her constitutional right not to have
evidence admitted against her in a criminal prosecution that was taken from
her without a consent and in the absence of probable cause.
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1197 (Ct. App. 2008).

In Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003), the Georgia Supreme
Court dealt with a statute nearly identical to that in Quinn:
[u]nder OCGA § 40-5-55(a), because Cooper was involved in an accident
resulting in "serious injuries," as defined in subsection (c) of the statute, he
was deemed by operation oflaw to have given consent to the administered
blood test to determine ifthere was the presence of alcohol or any other drug.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,285,587 S.E.2d 605,608 (2003)(citations omitted). The

Georgia Court noted:
[t]he high courts of several other states have grappled with the constitutionality
of provisions allowing the chemical testing of bodily substances without
probable cause or valid consent, and based solely on a serious traffic mishap.
These courts have uniformly rejected provisions which obviate the finding of
probable cause. See McDuff v. State, 763 Soold 850 (Miss.2000); Blank v.
State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska 2000); King v. Ryan, 153 mold 449, 180 Ill.Dec.
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260,607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152,615 A.2d
308 (Pa.1992). Compare State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Maine 1996).
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 287-88, 587 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003). The Court then
held, as did the Court in Quinn that an implied consent statute could not act to imply
consent where to do so would require the waiver of a motorist's Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure:

[t]his Court's use of the term "suspect" in regard to the Implied Consent
Statute brings into sharp focus the flaw in that portion of the statute compelling
chemical testing of the person merely by virtue of involvement in a traffic
accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. There is no requirement of
individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, that would render the
person "suspect" of impaired driving.
Thus, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the
operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious
injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it
authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003) In so holding the
Court cited the following language from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hannoy v. State,
789 N.E.2d 977,987 (Ind.App.2003):
[t]he legislature cannot, however, abrogate a person's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined by the
Supreme Court. To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws
stating that a person "impliedly" consents to searches under certain
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawfUl would be to
condone an unconstitutional bypassing o/the Fourth Amendment.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,290,587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003) The Court concluded
by stating:
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"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating." Hannoy v.
State, supra at 988. The illegally-obtained test results were not admissible
against Cooper at trial, and the trial court erred in denying Cooper's motion to
suppress such evidence.

Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 291, 587 S.E.2d 605,613 (2003)
In Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, on

reh'g~

793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. ct. App.

2003), the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the Marion County
Sheriff Department's policy of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from
drivers involved in accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death. Id. Hannay was
involved in an accident involving the death of another individual and, as in Quinn and

Cooper, law enforcement lacked probable cause to believe Hannoy to be DUI. Rejecting
a "special needs" argument as well as an argument that Indiana's implied consent statute
authorized the blood draw, the Court found the warrantless blood draw unconstitutional:
[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating. We are well
aware of the pain and suffering inflicted by intoxicated drivers on our roads.
Nevertheless, we do not perceive that our opinion today, which will apparently
require alterations in the standard policy of at least one major Indiana law
enforcement agency, will unduly burden law enforcement officers in collecting
blood alcohol readings in cases such as this ... To the extent our holding today
may lead to the loss of blood alcohol or illicit drug content evidence in some
cases, we heed the words of the Supreme Court in Schmerber that the Fourth
Amendment imposes limitations on the ability of police to investigate criminal
activity and sometimes requires police to "suffer the risk" that certain evidence
thereby will not be obtained. 384 U.S. at 770,86 S.Ct. at 1835.
The withdrawal of Hannoy's blood was not obtained pursuant to the
guidelines in the implied consent statutes and cannot be justified as being
drawn in accordance with those statutes. The withdrawal was not
accomplished in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and Schmerber
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because there was no probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the
time his blood was drawn and no actual, knowing, and voluntary consent to
the withdrawal. The "special needs" exception to the probable cause
requirement cannot be applied in the context of a criminal investigation by
law enforcement. Therefore, the blood alcohol content evidence obtained
from the blood draw performed at the request of law enforcement was
illegally obtained and should not have been admitted into evidence by the trial
court.

Hannay, at 987-89 on reh'g,. 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
The McNeely Court gave the clear mandate that "[i]n those drunk driving
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample
can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do so." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L.
Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Thus, after McNeely, a motorist arrested on suspicion ofDUI now clearly
has a constitutional right to be free from warrantless intrusions into their body absent the
existence of either a true showing of exigent circumstances cause or actual valid consent. As
such, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine now prohibits the legislature from bypassing
constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment and implying, or otherwise requiring,
consent upon the act of accepting the privilege to drive. Thus, the Diaz decision cited by the
State is inapplicable to this instant case. Consent cannot be implied when we are dealing
with the prospect of "consenting away" a valid Fourth Amendment right.
A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless the State proves it fell within one ofthe narrowly drawn exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36
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L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325,327
(Ct.App.2002). A search conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such
exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52
P.3d at 327. The State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221,93 S.Ct. 2041; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796,69 P.3d
1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,554,989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.l999);
Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. A voluntary decision is one that is "the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225,
93 S.Ct. 2041. See also, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602,81 S.Ct. 1860,6
L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).
While blood was ultimately extracted from Defendant, it was not taken with his
voluntary consent. It is not alleged that Defendant put up a violent struggle with the nurse or
the officer when the blood was extracted. However, it is clear from the totality of the
circumstances that he did not want to submit to any tests and that the blood was extracted
after he had already refused the officer's repeated requests for a test to determine the
concentration of alcohol in his body. Furthermore, mere acquiescence in the face of a claim
of authority does not equate to voluntary consent: [t]he State's burden to show that consent
was freely and voluntarily given cannot be met by "showing no more than acquiescence to a
claim oflawful authority." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118, 175 P.3d 801,807 (Ct. App.
2007)(quotingBumperv. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92,20
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L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968». The ALS advisory told Defendant he was "required by law" to
submit to the test. Given that fact, Defendant's mere acquiescence to the blood drawing
process does not equate to voluntary consent. Defendant did not consent to the blood draw
and thus consent cannot be used to subvert the requirement that law enforcement seek out a
warrant. The proper remedy is the suppression of the warrantless blood draw consistent with
Idaho court's rejection of the Leon Good Faith exception. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519,
272 P.3d 483, 491 (2012)
IV. CONCLUSION

The defense requests that the District Court's order suppressing the evidence of the
blood draw be upheld and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
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